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Abstract
A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we
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competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward
supporting import industries. This paper shows within a standard protection for
sale framework, how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade
subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable. The model is then esti-
mated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of
the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.
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1. Introduction
Trade policy is mainly import protection, whether we look at industrialized or devel-
oping countries. While economists have come up with many reasons to explain departures
from free trade, most of these reasons, such as the optimal tariff argument or strategic
trade policy arguments, cannot explain the occurrence of trade protection across a great
variety of countries and industry structures. The only theoretical branch with a potential
to explain why almost every country tries to influence trade flows in a vast array of dif-
ferent industries is the political economy of trade policy literature. The problem with this
literature, however, is that it usually comes to the conclusion (Rodrik 1995) that export
promotion should be more pronounced than import protection, a result very much at odds
with empirical facts.
It has been argued that the costliness of tax collection compared to tariff collection
(called costly revenue-raising henceforth) may explain why import tariffs are more prevalent
than export subsidies; e.g., Riezman and Slemrod (1987) show that tariff rates are increasing
in proxies of relative tax collection costs for a cross-section of countries in 1977. In this
paper, I investigate this possibility in a protection for sale framework. The protection for sale
model (Grossman and Helpman 1994) has by now become the new paradigm in the political
economy of trade policy literature, and it is thus a natural choice to view the problem of
costly revenue-raising in this setting. The protection for sale model has been tested for
the United States and other countries (e.g., Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu (2001) for
Turkey; McCalman (2004) for Australia; Cadot, Grether, and Olarreaga (2003) for India)
and has been found to fit the data well.1 Whereas studies for other countries usually
employ tariff data as protection measure, studies for the United States (e.g., Goldberg and
Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and Eicher and Osang (2002) to name
the most influential) typically use non-tariff barrier (NTB) coverage ratios as protection
1Although several papers in the literature find empirical evidence to support the protection for sale
hypothesis, none of the tests these papers employ prove conclusively that the protection for sale model is
the model generating the data; see, e.g., Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Imai, Katayama, and Krishna
(2005). The current literature’s focus on the protection for sale model seems to be due to its solid micro
foundations. Once other theoretically well-founded contending models emerge, tests between them may well
lead to different conclusions.
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measure,2 despite the fact that the theoretical protection for sale model was developed
for tariffs. The cited reason for this digression from theory is that tariff levels are set in
multilateral negotiations, whereas the protection for sale model assumes that trade policy
can be set unilaterally by the domestic government.
In this paper, I break with the tradition of using NTB coverage ratios, and instead
use tariff data to investigate the importance of costly revenue-raising. The main reason
for doing so is, of course, that many NTB measures do not create governmental revenue.
Moreover, it is common knowledge that NTB coverage ratios, by the very manner in which
they are constructed, can only provide very imperfect measures of how strongly protected an
industry is. For example, compare two industries that both only produce one product. For
one product, a technical standard applies which could be considered a trade impediment,
but in practice may have very little influence on imports. For the other product, an import
ban prevents the import of this good from abroad. Yet, when we compare trade policy
restrictiveness based on NTB coverage ratios, we find that both industries are equally
protected, with an NTB coverage ratio of 100%. Hence, we have to question whether using
NTB coverage ratios in lieu of tariffs when testing the protection for sale model yields
reliable results.
Yet, the problem remains that tariffs are set in multilateral negotiations. This prob-
lem may not be as big as it may seem at first glance, though. Trade liberalization negotia-
tions start from the status quo of unilaterally-set tariffs and then seek to lower tariffs from
this start level. Oftentimes, the goal of negotiations is to achieve a percentage tariff cut that
applies equally to all industries; e.g., the proposed tariff cut in the GATT Kennedy Round
was 50%. If such a tariff cut comes through, the structure of pre-negotiation tariffs will be
preserved. Moreover, governments usually succeed in getting exemptions from tariff cuts
for industries for which trade policy intervention is deemed especially important. This then
further preserves or even deepens existing inter-industry tariff variations. On theoretical
grounds, Grossman and Helpman (1995) have shown that the difference between the tariff
rates of two large countries that negotiate over trade policy is the same as in the protection
for sale model where tariffs are set unilaterally. An even stronger argument for the valid-
ity of the protection for sale predictions, even when countries are large and negotiate over
2Some recent exceptions include Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2004) who use tariff data and Lopez
and Matschke (2006) who use implicit tariff data.
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trade policy, comes from Bagwell and Staiger (1999). They show that when large symmet-
ric countries start at the non-cooperative Nash tariff equilibrium and then gradually and
reciprocally reduce tariffs, eventually they will end up at the politically optimal tariff level
for a small country. This means that the protection for sale predictions for a small country
that sets its tariff policy unilaterally may very well coincide with the tariff outcome for a
large country that participates in multilateral trade negotiations.
In this paper, I show that the protection for sale model explains U.S. tariff data
very well once costly revenue-raising is incorporated into the model. I obtain very precise
estimates of how costly it is to raise revenue by means other than a tariff. It is further
demonstrated that if costly revenue-raising is ignored, the protection for sale model performs
poorly when confronted with U.S. tariff data. The conclusion is that costly revenue-raising
is a major determinant of the observed bias toward supporting import-competing industries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I show how costly
revenue-raising alters the equilibrium trade policy results of the protection for sale model.
Section 3 uses data from U.S. manufacturing to test whether costly revenue-raising can
account for part of the observed bias toward import protection. Section 4 concludes.
2. Theoretical Model
2.1. Basic setup. In the following, I augment Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) protection
for sale model, from now on called GH model, to allow for costly revenue-raising.
As in the original GH model, I assume a small country with n+ 1 industries facing
an exogenous vector of world prices. The country owns fixed amounts of industry-specific
capital Ki, where i = 1, . . . , n. Labor is supplied inelastically by the country’s population.
The population size is fixed at L. While labor cannot leave or enter the country, it is
perfectly mobile between all domestic industries i, where i = 0, . . . , n. Industries i = 1, . . . , n
are the industries of interest; i.e., the industries which may be subject to trade policy. Each
of them produces a single, tradable good using labor and sector-specific capital according
to a linearly homogeneous and weakly concave production function Fi. Industry 0 produces
a numeraire good from labor with a one-to-one technology, F0 = L0. Good 0 is traded
freely; i.e., its trade is never subject to any trade policy intervention. Clearly, the world
market price of good 0, which is normalized to 1, fixes the wage rate. Production in the
numeraire industry thus provides a buffer for the other industries: Any labor set free in
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the non-numeraire industries can find employment in sector 0, and any additional labor
needs in other sectors can be met by withdrawing labor from the numeraire sector without
affecting wages.
On the consumption side, it is assumed that all individuals have identical quasilinear
preferences. The utility function for any individual is the sum of his good 0 consumption
and strictly concave and increasing transformations of the consumption of each of the non-
numeraire goods 1 to n.3 Quasilinearity of preferences implies that the indirect utility
function of any individual is additively separable into an income and a price component.
Specifically, indirect utility can be written as the sum of income and consumer surplus Vi
from consumption of good i where i goes from 1 to n.
The domestic government raises revenue from a wage tax, import tariffs, and export
taxes and uses these monies to pay for export and import subsidies as well as for a public
service. Since the wage rate is fixed and labor supply is inelastic, the wage tax may also
be viewed as a per-capita tax. Tariff revenue can be used as alternative source of income.
Hence, if the government wants to levy a fixed amount of revenue, an increase in tariff
revenue decreases the tax that has to be raised.4
Costly revenue-raising is modelled as follows: Raising the wage tax is costly; i.e., in
order to have a certain amount X available from the tax, the government has to raise an
amount Lf (X) which exceeds X. Here, we can think of the difference Lf (X)−X as some
additional labor input requirement for raising the tax which the government formally pays,
but whose cost is covered by raising the tax amount accordingly. In the end, the costliness
of taxation reduces the labor input available in the numeraire sector 0. For simplicity, the
function Lf (X) is assumed to be linear in X, namely Lf (X) = cX, where c > 1. The
government uses the tax revenue to finance export and import subsidies as well as provide
a service to the population. Here, this service is treated as if it were a simple hand-out of
a constant amount T , which is distributed evenly among the population.
3It is assumed that each individual has enough income to consume all goods; i.e., corner solutions are
excluded.
4Instead of considering a wage tax, it is also theoretically possible to look at an income tax. Compared
to the wage tax, this complicates the results because not only the tax rate, but also the tax base depends
on the chosen trade policy. In the appendix, I solve for the equilibrium trade policy equation in the income
tax case and show that this equation is, in general, not estimable with the data currently available.
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In some of the industries, but not the numeraire industry 0, capital owners are active
lobbyists that solicit trade protection from the domestic government. Each lobby offers the
government a schedule that lists its contributions as a function of the domestic price vector
p. The domestic price vector p may differ from the world price vector p∗ if the domestic
government imposes a vector t of specific import or export tariffs or subsidies. Hence, if p∗i
denotes the world market price of good i, then the domestic price is pi = p∗i + ti. Suppose
good i is an import good. Then ti > 0 (ti < 0) means that an import tariff (import subsidy)
is imposed. In contrast, if good i is an export good, then ti > 0 (ti < 0) implies an export
subsidy (export tax). The lobbies’ goal is to maximize their members’ income. The part
of income that depends on the chosen price vector consists of profits, consumer surplus,
and the wage income after taxes. Imposing an export tax or an import tariff reduces the
necessary tax amount whose raising is costly, so the tax rate can be lowered following
c(T −
n∑
j=1
tjMj) = τL (2.1)
where τ stands for the wage tax rate and Mj > 0 (Mj < 0) denotes imports (exports) of
good j. In (2.1), the money that has to be raised via domestic taxation appears on the
left-hand side and the levied tax on the right-hand side. If the tariff revenue increases, the
tax rate τ can be lowered.
The government maximizes the weighted sum of total contributions and aggregate
welfare by choice of the trade policy vector. Here, the weight on aggregate welfare is denoted
by a. Contributions C receive a weight of 1. I assume that contributions do not form part of
the funds which the government uses for providing services to the citizens, so contributions
cannot be used directly to decrease costly taxation.
The solution to the lobbying game follows the findings in GH. The equilibrium tariff
vector is described by the following conditions: It maximizes the government’s utility func-
tion, and it maximizes the sum of governmental utility and the utility of any lobby. The
number of conditions is thus equal to the number of lobbies plus one. A corollary of this
result, as pointed out by GH, is that the equilibrium tariff can alternatively be calculated
by maximizing the weighted sum of domestic welfare and the welfare of the different active
lobby groups.5
5The GH model thus provides micro foundations for the political support function approach where the
welfares of different groups in society receive differing weights in the governmental objective function.
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2.2. Equilibrium trade policy. Before investigating the case with lobbying, it seems
worthwhile to look at the equilibrium trade policy which emerges when the domestic gov-
ernment simply maximizes domestic welfare. Given quasilinear utility, domestic welfare is
the sum of consumer surplus Vj from consuming the non-numeraire goods j = 1, . . . , n and
domestic income. Income consists of the value of production pjFj in industries j = 0, . . . , n
and trade policy revenue tjMj for goods j = 1, . . . , n; i.e., the government maximizes
n∑
j=1
Vj +
n∑
j=0
pjFj +
n∑
j=1
tjMj .
To see that costly revenue-raising has an impact on domestic welfare, write out the pro-
duction value in the numeraire industry 0, noting that this industry produces one unit of
output from one unit of labor and that its price is normalized to 1, and further noting that
costly revenue-raising reduces the amount of labor used in industry 0. Domestic welfare is
hence given by
n∑
j=1
Vj +
n∑
j=1
pjFj + [L−
n∑
j=1
Lj − (c− 1)(T −
n∑
j=1
tjMj)] +
n∑
j=1
tjMj .
The term in brackets is the production value in the numeraire industry. Rearranging slightly,
domestic welfare equals
n∑
j=1
Vj +
n∑
j=1
Πj + (1− c)T + c
n∑
j=1
tjMj ,
where Πj stands for profits in industry j. The above expression shows that the costliness
of raising revenue via taxes puts an additional weight c on tariff revenue. The intuition for
this higher weight is simple: Tariff revenue reduces the resources needed in the revenue-
raising industry and increases the production value in the numeraire industry. Simplifying
and omitting all components that do not depend on ti, the government chooses ti (where
i = 1, . . . , n) to maximize
WG = Vi +Πi + ctiMi.
The welfare maximizing trade policy for sector i is hence
tGi = −
(c− 1)Mi
cM ′i
. (2.2)
To sign this expression, I make use of the standard assumption M ′i < 0. If revenue-raising
were not costly, then c = 1 and free trade would emerge, the usual result for small countries
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that free trade is optimal. However, since income from trade policy can be used to lower
the levied tax and thus the cost from taxation, the government will impose an import tariff
(tGi > 0) on import goods (Mi > 0), whereas for export goods (Mi < 0) an export tax (t
G
i <
0) is optimal. This means that even for the simple case of domestic welfare maximization,
introducing costly revenue-raising induces incentives to favor import-competing industries
and to hurt exporting industries.
To gain a better understanding of the outcome of the protection for sale lobbying
game, it is reasonable to look at the trade policy measures that lobby groups would set
if they could unilaterally do so. It has been shown elsewhere (Matschke 2004) that the
equilibrium trade policy vector of the protection for sale model can be – roughly speaking
– expressed as a weighted average of the unilaterally optimal tariffs of the players of the
lobbying game. Viewing these tariffs separately provides a better understanding of the
forces that ultimately determine the equilibrium trade policy.
If capital owners of industry k, where k 6= i, could set the trade policy instrument
for sector i, they would do so to maximize6
Wk = θk[Vi + (1− τ)L],
where θk is the population share of capital owners in industry k and τ can be rewritten as
c
L(T −
∑n
j=1 tjMj) according to (2.1). The first-order condition for maximization of Wk is
tki = −
Mi
M ′i
+
Di
cM ′i
, (2.3)
where Di stands for demand of good i. When c = 1, we see that other industries desire an
import subsidy or export tax for industry i depending on whether i is an import-competing
or exporting industry. This changes, however, once the case of costly revenue-raising c > 1
is considered. It is easy to see that (2.3) is negative for Mi < 0; i.e., exporting industries
would be left with an export tax if the other lobbies could decide trade policy for sector i.
However, due to the additional costs of subsidies, it is no longer clear whether the outcome
would be an import subsidy for import-competing industries.
Turning to the interests of capital owners in industry i itself, note that
Wi = Πi + θi[(1− τ)Li + Vi],
6Here and in the following, I leave out all welfare components that do not depend on ti.
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which is maximized by
tii = −
1− θi
θic
Fi
M ′i
− c− 1
c
Mi
M ′i
. (2.4)
If revenue-raising were not costly, capital owners in i would want an import tariff (for
Mi > 0) or export subsidy (for Mi < 0). Costly revenue-raising reinforces the case for an
import tariff, whereas it is no longer clear whether industry i would want an export subsidy
for its own good.
I now address the solution to the lobbying game itself. Denote by Θ the percentage
of all lobbies in the population. I begin with the case that industry i lobbies. As was stated
earlier, the equilibrium trade policy instrument t∗i maximizes a times domestic welfare plus
the sum of all lobby welfares, which, after substituting for the tax rate τ and omitting terms
that do not depend on ti, can be written as
a(Vi + Πi + ctiMi) + Πi + θi[ctiMi + Vi] + (Θ − θi)[ctiMi + Vi]. (2.5)
The equilibrium trade policy instrument when industry i lobbies is thus implicitly given by
t∗i = −
1−Θ
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )c
− c− 1
c
Mi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
(2.6)
or equivalently
t∗i = −
1−Θ
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
+
c− 1
c
[
1 + a
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
− Di(t
∗
i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
]
.
If c = 1, import-competing lobbies would receive an import tariff and exporting
industries would receive an export subsidy. But for c > 1, import-competing industries
always receive an import tariff, whereas it is not clear whether exporting industries will
end up with an export subsidy. It is also easy to show that the optimal trade policy is
increasing in demand Di if industry size (as measured by output Fi) and the slope of the
import demand curve are held constant. Notice that the derivative with respect to Di of
the first-order maximization condition for (2.5), holding Fi and M ′i constant, is
(a+Θ)(c− 1) > 0
and has the same sign as dt∗i /dDi as long as the second-order condition of maximization
holds.7 In particular, this means that any potential export subsidy would not match the
7With costly revenue-raising, it is no longer clear that dt∗i /dFi > 0, holding Di and M
′
i constant; i.e.,
bigger industries in terms of output do not necessarily receive more protection.
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import tariff in size for two otherwise equal industries, one import-competing and one
exporting.8
It remains to analyze the case where capital owners of industry i do not lobby. In
this case, the equilibrium trade policy instrument maximizes
a(Vi +Πi + ctiMi) + Θ[ctiMi + Vi]. (2.7)
The equilibrium trade policy instrument for sector i when its capital owners do not lobby
is thus given by
t∗i =
Θ
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
cM ′i(t
∗
i )
− c− 1
c
Mi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
, (2.8)
or, equivalently, by
t∗i =
Θ
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
+
c− 1
c
[
a
a+Θ
Fi(t∗i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
− Di(t
∗
i )
M ′i(t
∗
i )
]
.
If c = 1, import-competing lobbies would receive an import subsidy and exporting
industries would receive an export tax. For c > 1, the case for an export tax is reinforced,
but it is no longer clear whether import-competing industries will have to bear an import
subsidy. It is once again easy to show that the optimal trade policy is increasing in demand
Di, holding Fi and M ′i fixed; i.e., industries of the same size (as measured by their output
Fi) receive higher t∗i as demand increases.
9 In particular, any export tax put on goods of
an exporting industry will exceed the corresponding import subsidy (if any) for an import-
competing industry of equal size; i.e., import-competing industries will be favored over
exporting industries. The intuition behind the positive relationship betweenDi and t∗i , after
controlling for Fi and M ′i , is straightforward: For an import-competing industry protected
by an import tariff, higher demand increases the tariff base that can be tapped into by
a higher import tariff (similarly, for an industry facing an import subsidy, higher demand
leads to a higher subsidy base which then induces an incentive to lower the subsidy), so
costly taxation can be reduced. A similar reasoning applies to exporting industries.
The positive relationship between equilibrium import tariff and demand is in contrast
with the findings in Ederington and Minier (2005), henceforth EM, where the relationship
8Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000) derive a similar import protection bias by assuming different weights
on different welfare components in the governmental welfare function, in particular, they assume that tariff
revenue receives a weight that exceeds one.
9Notice that for t∗i < 0, an increase in Di implies a smaller export tax or smaller import subsidy.
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between equilibrium tariff and demand is negative. This difference in results arises from
several distinct modelling differences between the two papers. For instance, EM allow
for domestic production subsidies, but do not explicitly consider the revenue role of their
policy instruments. In this case, the government would not choose trade policy at all in the
standard GH model because domestic production subsidies can help producers just as well
as trade policy instruments without distorting consumption. In order to reintroduce trade
policy into their model, EM assume the existence of an unspecified benefit of trade policy.
Their equilibrium tariff is hence a function of demand, demand elasticity and the marginal
external benefit of trade policy (assumed constant across industries) only; in particular, t∗i
does not depend on output and is inversely related to demand because the marginal benefit
of a tariff is constant for all industries, but the negative effects on consumers are higher
for industries with higher demand. In the next section, I show that I find no evidence of
any negative relationship between import tariffs and demand, and moreover, output and
whether or not an industry lobbies seem to matter as well. However, the data set I use
is for manufacturing industries where production subsidies are far less common than in
agriculture, so it is not all that surprising that EM find empirical support for their model
predictions in a cross-country sample of agricultural commodities.
In the following section, I test the implications of my model with import protection
data. These data, at least with respect to import tariffs, are readily available, and import
protection is without doubt the most prevalent form of trade policy intervention.10
3. Econometrics
To estimate the model and test its predictions, I use 1983 data for U.S. manufacturing
industries described in Matschke and Sherlund (2006). The tariff rates and political action
committee (PAC) contributions were provided by Kishore Gawande and are described in
Gawande (1995). Data on imports and exports were taken from the NBER trade and
immigration data base, shipments and value-added from the NBER productivity data base
by Bartelsman and Gray (1996); elasticity estimates come from the study by Shiells, Stern,
10I do not consider export policy, but clearly, my model cannot solve the empirical puzzle of why export
policy is much less pronounced than import policy. In particular, it cannot answer the question as to why
we see so few export taxes, especially in industrialized nations.
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and Deardorff (1986). Data on instruments11 were provided by Daniel Trefler; see Trefler
(1993) and Matschke and Sherlund (2006). After merging the data from different sources,
194 four-digit SIC manufacturing industries are left. Summary statistics for key variables
are reported in Table 1.
The econometric model follows directly from (2.6) and (2.8). Letting Ii be the dummy
variable indicating lobbying by capital owners in industry i, the protection equation can be
rewritten in a unified form as
t∗i = [1−
a
(a+Θ)c
]
Fi
M ′i
− 1
(a+Θ)c
Ii
Fi
M ′i
− c− 1
c
Di
M ′i
. (3.1)
To rewrite (3.1) in terms of observables, transform it as
t∗i M˜ ′i = [
a
(a+Θ)c
− 1]F˜i + 1(a+Θ)cIiF˜i +
c− 1
c
D˜i, (3.2)
where F˜i is the value of shipments minus exports12 and D˜i the value of domestic consumption
in industry i. The expression t∗i M˜ ′i is calculated as −t∗i piM ′i = t˜∗i eiM˜i/(1 + t˜∗i ), where t˜∗i is
the equilibrium ad valorem tariff rate, ei = −M ′ipi/Mi the absolute price elasticity of import
demand, and M˜i the value of imports. In the literature, the import demand elasticity is
often included as part of the dependent variable to account for the fact that it is a generated
(i.e. estimated) variable; see Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for a discussion. I follow a similar
procedure here by including M˜ ′i , which is calculated using the estimated import demand
elasticity, on the left-hand side. The estimation equation thus becomes
t∗i M˜ ′i = β1F˜i + β2IiF˜i + β3D˜i + ²i, (3.3)
11The instrumental variables include factor shares (defined as factor revenues divided by production value)
for physical capital, inventories, engineers and scientists, skilled labor, semiskilled labor, and unskilled labor.
Other instruments include seller concentration, seller number of firms, buyer concentration, buyer number
of firms, capital-labor ratio, capital stock, unionization, geographic concentration, and tenure.
12Subtracting exports to calculate F˜i is necessary since exports are not sold at the domestic, tariff-inclusive
price.
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where, according to theory,
β1 =
a
(a+Θ)c
− 1 < 0,
β2 =
1
(a+Θ)c
> 0,
β3 =
c− 1
c
> 0,
β1 + β2 + β3 =
1−Θ
(a+Θ)c
≥ 0.
The basic GH specification without costly revenue-raising results when c = 1, so that β3 = 0.
Notice that all coefficient signs can be predicted, and moreover, we know that β1 + β2 + β3
should be positive. All structural parameters are exactly identified; namely, c = 1/(1−β3),
Θ = −(β1 + β3)/β2, and a = (1 + β1)/β2.
I estimate and compare the basic GH specification with the cost-of-funds specifica-
tion derived in this paper. Several complications arise in estimating these models. First,
components of the explanatory variables are endogenously determined; hence, instrumental
variable techniques have to be used. A second complication arises because some of the
explanatory variables are generated regressors; e.g., it is necessary to determine which of
the industries are politically organized and lobby for trade policy. It is therefore important
to explore the sensitivity of the results to different variable formulations.
Standard theory suggests that domestic production of good i for the home market
is an increasing function of the tariff ti and should therefore be treated as an endoge-
nous explanatory variable in the econometric model. Moreover, domestic consumption is
decreasing in the tariff, and the political organization variable is also potentially endoge-
nous. Therefore, I estimate (3.3) by the two-step optimal Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) using moment conditions generated by the orthogonality of the structural error
and the instruments. For overidentified models, optimal GMM is asymptotically better
than two-stage least squares (2SLS), used in an earlier version of the paper, because it is
more efficient; i.e., the standard errors are smaller.13
For the baseline case, the model is estimated without a constant because according
to theory there should not be a constant term in the estimation equation, see, e.g., Goldberg
132SLS point estimates (not reported in this version) are very similar to the GMM estimates reported
here.
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and Maggi (1999) and Eicher and Osang (2002). In the sensitivity analysis, I also report
results when a constant term is included in the estimation equation and show that the
results are very similar to the case without a constant.
Although the protection for sale model does not provide much guidance on how to
infer which industries are organized, this knowledge is important in estimating it. I use
different approaches to categorize industries with and without organized lobbies to ensure
that the uncertainty about the lobby indicator does not drive the results. In the first spec-
ification (labeled XM in Table 2), I regress PAC contributions (divided by value-added) on
a constant and deadweight losses from protection (divided by value-added) interacted with
2-digit SIC dummy variables.14 If the coefficient on an interaction is positive, I assume
that all industries within this 2-digit SIC classification lobby. This is supported by theory
since in the protection for sale model, lobby contributions are increasing in the deadweight
loss from lobbying. For the second specification (labeled GB in Table 2), I follow Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000). To determine which industries are organized, I regress PAC
contributions (divided by value-added) on a constant and import penetration ratios inter-
acted with 2-digit SIC dummy variables. As before, if an interaction coefficient is positive, I
assume that all industries within this classification lobby. The idea behind this specification
is that in case of an active lobby, industries that are threatened more by imports (as evi-
denced by a higher import penetration ratio) will spend greater resources on lobbying. For
the third specification (labeled GM in Table 2), I divide PAC contributions by value-added
and then use a simple cutoff of 0.0001; industries where this variable exceeds the cutoff are
considered to be organized lobbies. This is similar to Goldberg and Maggi (1999) except
that they use gross contributions to determine the cutoff value. This specification is justified
if industries contribute for a variety of reasons and only those with high contributions also
contribute to influence trade policy.
To further account for the fact that the lobby indicator is a generated variable, I
also consider variations of the regression-based XM and GB procedures by only considering
industries as organized if the coefficient on the interaction term with the 2-digit SIC classifi-
cation is positive and significant. Results for these indicator specifications appear as XMsig
and GBsig, respectively, in Table 2. Finally, I also report bootstrapped standard errors as
14I use the formula 0.5M˜ieit˜∗i /(1 + t˜
∗
i )
2, given, e.g., in Vousden (1990), p. 49, for linear demand and
supply to approximate the deadweight loss.
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an alternative to the usual asymptotic standard errors. P-values based on the bootstrapped
standard errors are given in brackets, whereas p-values from traditional standard errors are
in parentheses.
Table 2 reports optimal GMM estimation results for the cost-of-funds specification
and the simple GH specification. All explanatory variables are instrumented for, using
instruments comparable to the ones in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000), and Matschke and Sherlund (2006); namely, unionization percentage,
factor shares, concentration ratios, scale, capital stock, tenure, capital-labor ratio, and geo-
graphic concentration. The instrumental variables are tested for validity, i.e., orthogonality
to the structural error. The reported J-statistics show that the instruments are valid for
the cost-of-funds specification with GBsig being a borderline case at the 10% level of sig-
nificance. In contrast, for the basic GH specification, the J-test always rejects the validity
of instruments at the 5% level. This indicates that the basic GH model leaves out impor-
tant determinants of trade protection. The first-stage F-statistics, which are not reported
in Table 2 to conserve space, show that the instruments are relevant. F-statistics for all
specifications have a lower bound of 14 for F˜i and D˜i. They are lower for IiF˜i, but the
hypothesis that the instruments do not explain IiF˜i is always rejected at least at the 0.1%
level of significance.
Looking at the coefficient estimates in Table 2, the results are highly supportive of
the cost-of-funds specification. All reduced-form parameter estimates have the right signs
and are statistically significant at least at the 5% level when the asymptotic standard errors
are used and at least at the 10% level when the bootstrapped standard errors are employed.
The point estimates add up to a positive number, which is in line with β1 + β2 + β3 ≥ 0.
The null of β3 = 0 is strongly rejected in all specifications. Estimates of the structural
parameters look very good as well.15 As with other studies, I find that the estimate of
the weight on domestic welfare in the governmental welfare function is high; i.e., the point
estimates for a range between 34.72 in the XMsig case and 114.46 in the GB case and are
quite close to the estimate reported in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), where NTB coverage
ratios were used to measure trade protection. Point estimates for the percentage of the
population represented by lobbies Θ lie between 5.93% for the XMsig case and 47.42%
15Standard errors for the structural parameters are calculated using the delta method.
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for the GB case. They seem quite reasonable and are close to the estimates reported by
Eicher and Osang (2002) and lower than those reported in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The cost parameter c is very precisely estimated
as lying between 1.03 and 1.05. This suggests that raising one dollar of governmental
revenue via alternative taxes costs 3-5 cents more than the administrative costs of raising
one dollar by means of a tariff, abstracting from the welfare costs of the tariff. Furthermore,
the 99% confidence interval for c always excludes 1 when conventional standard errors are
used. The results are very similar with bootstrapped standard errors. Interestingly, the
XM specification, which is preferable on theoretical grounds, leads to less precise estimates
with bootstrapped standard errors, but even in this case c is statistically different from 1
at the 10% significance level. In short, the results indeed suggest a positive cost of revenue-
raising. That the estimate is quite close to 1 is not surprising, either. We would expect the
marginal cost estimate of fund-raising to be substantially larger when looking at developing
countries that heavily depend on income from trade restrictions (Kubota 2005). Yet, the
results indicate that even in the U.S., the cost of raising funds still has a significant effect
on trade protection.
Results for the simple GH specification show that the tariff data only offer weak
support for the basic protection for sale model.16 The estimate of β1 has the wrong (positive)
sign in all specifications, but is not statistically different from zero, with the exception of
the GM and XMsig specifications where it is not only positive, but significant as well. As
a consequence, the point estimate of Θ is always negative. The results for the simple GH
specification, contrary to the cost-of-funds specification, thus do not provide strong support
for the protection for sale model when tariff data are used as protection measure.
In the sensitivity analysis reported in Table 3, using the alternative lobby indi-
cator specifications XM, GB, and GM,17 I first consider an alternative protection mea-
sure: the tariff levels from the data set of Chris Magee, which was downloaded from
http://www.internationaldata.org. The estimates obtained with these data (columns
16This is contrary to the results with NTB coverage ratio data for the U.S. in 1983 which support the
basic protection for sale model, as shown by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), Eicher and Osang (2002), and Matschke and Sherlund (2006).
17The results for XMsig and GBsig are similar, but not reported to conserve space.
COSTLY REVENUE-RAISING 17
1–3 of Table 3) are also very similar to the original results and provide very strong sup-
port for the cost-of-funds specification. They also show the robustness of the cost estimates.
Compared to the results obtained when using the Gawande tariff data, they increase slightly
to 4–6 cents per dollar.
As a second robustness check, I consider all three capital lobby indicator specifi-
cations, but now estimate the model with a constant. The inclusion of a constant is a
rudimentary way to allow factors outside the protection for sale model to matter for trade
protection. The results are reported in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3. In two of the three
specifications, the estimate of β0 is significantly different from 0. The estimates of β1, β2,
and β3 all have the right signs and are statistically significant at the 5% level when con-
ventional standard errors are used. With bootstrapped standard errors, the estimate of β2
is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance in two of the
three specifications. Compared to the model without the constant, the estimates of Θ and
a are somewhat higher, but remain well within the range of estimates reported previously
in the literature. Most importantly, the estimate of c remains highly significant in all spec-
ifications, and the point estimates are almost identical to those obtained in the no-constant
model.
Next, I introduce a labor market variable, which measures redistribution between
workers and firms, into the estimation equation. A detailed description about how to
introduce the labor market into the protection for sale model can be found in Matschke
and Sherlund (2006) who use NTB coverage ratios to estimate the labor-augmented model.
To infer which labor groups are organized, I use similar procedures as employed for the
capital lobby indicator: In the XM case, I use an auxiliary regression where labor PAC
contributions (divided by union wage sum) are regressed on a constant and deadweight
losses from protection (divided by union wage sum) interacted with 2-digit SIC dummy
variables. If the parameter estimate for an interaction variable is positive, I assume that
labor in all industries within this classification lobbies. In the GB case, the same procedure
is repeated, replacing deadweight loss by import penetration ratio. Finally in the GM case,
the same cutoff value of 0.0001 to determine capital owner lobbying is also used for labor
PAC contributions (divided by union wage sum). To classify industries into those with
mobile and immobile labor, a cutoff of 10% for the industry unemployment rate is used as
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in Matschke and Sherlund (2006). In the tariff case, the labor variable is not significant in
the “long specification” where IiF˜i and the labor variable appear as separate explanatory
variables. At the same time, the equality of their coefficients cannot be rejected so that
the estimation of the “short specification”, where IiF˜i plus the labor variable appears as
single explanatory variable, is feasible. Results for this short specification are reported in
columns 7–9 of Table 3. A comparison with Table 2 shows that the conclusions are very
similar to the case without an included labor variable. In particular, the estimates for the
costly parameter c are almost identical.
Finally, I also redo the estimation after dividing both sides of the estimation equa-
tion by imports. The results obtained in this case are quite interesting. Looking at the
parameter estimates, we see that the point estimates for β1 and β3 increase, whereas the
point estimate for β2 decreases dramatically and is no longer statistically different from 0 at
usual significance levels (the only exception occurs in the GM case with conventional stan-
dard errors, where β2 remains statistically significant at the 10% level). For the structural
coefficient estimates, this means that the estimate of a shoots up to levels between 3000 and
12500, estimates quite comparable to those found in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).
The estimates for c increase slightly, but at levels between 1.07 and 1.08, they are still
quite similar to the previous results and statistically significant at the 1% level. However,
it would be a mistake to consider this final part of the sensitivity analysis as supporting the
costly-funds version of the protection for sale model. Rather, there are strong indications
that the model specification with division by imports is problematic for the tariff case. To
begin with, the parameter estimates for β1 and β3 are practically identical in absolute value
which was not previously the case. Further, notice that once we divide by imports, it is no
longer possible to have a constant in the regression because of perfect multicollinearity (since
Di/Mi − Fi/Mi = 1). In fact, since β2 is not statistically different from 0, the results are
very similar to a regression without the lobby variable for which −β1 = β3 = E(ZY )/E(Z),
where Z is the instrumental variable, Y the dependent variable, and E the expectation op-
erator. Therefore, these coefficients should not be given a protection for sale interpretation.
A look at the validity and relevance of instruments explains why the results after division
by imports are not reliable: The F-statistics for the first stage drop to very low levels, and
the associated p-values sometimes even rise above 0.1, meaning that the instruments have
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little relevance. Even worse, the J-statistics always indicate that the instruments are not
valid; i.e., not uncorrelated with the structural error. The validity of instruments is rejected
in all cases, with p-values always below 0.01. These findings indicate that when evaluating
the protection for sale model empirically, the performance of the chosen instruments should
be carefully examined.
4. Conclusion
This paper shows how introducing costly revenue-raising (i.e., the marginal cost of
raising additional revenue exceeds unity) into a standard protection for sale model may
explain why, in general, import-competing industries receive more trade policy support
than exporting industries. This cost-of-funds specification of the protection for sale model,
tested using 1983 U.S. tariff data, finds strong empirical support. In contrast, the basic
Grossman-Helpman model is only weakly supported by the tariff data. The point estimate
of the cost of raising one dollar in taxes lies between 3 and 6 cents, with the lower boundary
of 99% confidence intervals for this cost usually exceeding 0. Costly revenue-raising thus
seems to have a significant effect on tariff levels, all else being equal. The policy implication
is that part of the bias toward import protection can be explained by the fact that import
tariffs raise governmental revenue and as such reduce the need for costly revenue-raising via
taxes.
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Appendix A. Income tax and equilibrium trade policy
In the following, I consider an income tax as opposed to a wage tax. In this case, the
governmental budget constraint (2.1), which equalizes tax needs and tax revenue, becomes
c(T −
n∑
j=1
tjMj) = τ(L+
n∑
j=1
Πj + T ), (A.1)
where τ is the income tax rate. The income tax complicates matters because tax rate and
tax base now both depend on ti.
As before, I start by discussing the unilaterally optimal tariffs for different par-
ticipants in the lobbying game. Clearly, the domestic welfare-maximizing tariff is still
given by (2.2), but the unilaterally optimal tariffs for the lobby groups have to be recal-
culated. If lobby k 6= i could set the tariff ti unilaterally, it would do so to maximize
Wk = θkVi+ (1− τ)(θk(L+ T ) +Πk). Defining βk as the share of group k’s income in total
income, lobby k’s unilaterally optimal tariff on good i is
tki =
θkDi − τβkFi − cβkMi
cβkM
′
i
.
Similarly, lobby group i would set the tariff for its own product to maximize Wi = θiVi +
(1− τ)(θi(L+ T ) + Πi). Lobby i’s unilaterally optimal tariff on good i is thus
tii =
θiDi − τβiFi − cβiMi − (1− τ)Fi
cβiM ′i
.
Notice that since the income share of a lobby group is not equal to its population share,
these expressions cannot be simplified further. Aggregating the unilaterally optimal tariffs
to the equilibrium tariff for good i, I find that
t∗i = −
a(c− 1) + cΘ−∑j∈Ω γjθj
c(a+Θ)
Di
M ′i
+
a(c− 1) + (c− τ)Θ
c(a+Θ)
Fi
M ′i
− γi(1− τ)
c(a+Θ)
IiFi
M ′i
(A.2)
where γj = θj/βj and the summation over j ∈ Ω is over all industries with active lobbies.
If we bring the absolute elasticity of import demand over to the left-hand side, the result
resembles the one in the wage tax case in that the coefficient on demand Di is positive
(since the income shares of lobbies always exceed their population shares, we have cΘ >∑
j∈Ω γjθj), the coefficient on output Fi is negative, and the coefficient on IiFi is positive.
In (A.2), Di, Fi, Ii, τ , M ′i and ti are observed. However, the γi are industry-specific and
unobserved, so that (A.2) cannot be estimated.
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